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Logic and Categories As Tools For Building Theories
Samson Abramsky
Oxford University Computing Laboratory
1 Introduction
My aim in this short article is to provide an impression of some of the ideas emerging at the
interface of logic and computer science, in a form which I hope will be accessible to philosophers.
Why is this even a good idea? Because there has been a huge interaction of logic and computer
science over the past half-century which has not only played an important roˆle in shaping Computer
Science, but has also greatly broadened the scope and enriched the content of logic itself.
This huge effect of Computer Science on Logic over the past five decades has several aspects:
new ways of using logic, new attitudes to logic, new questions and methods. These lead to new
perspectives on the question:
What logic is — and should be!
Our main concern is with method and attitude rather than matter; nevertheless, we shall base
the general points we wish to make on a case study: Category theory. Many other examples could
have been used to illustrate our theme, but this will serve to illustrate some of the points we wish
to make.
2 Category Theory
Category theory is a vast subject. It has enormous potential for any serious version of ‘formal
philosophy’ — and yet this has hardly been realized.
We shall begin with introduction to some basic elements of category theory, focussing on the
fascinating conceptual issues which arise even at the most elementary level of the subject, and
then discuss some its consequences and philosophical ramifications.
2.1 Some Basic Notions of Category Theory
We briefly recall the basic definitions. A category has a collections of objects A, B, C, . . . , and
a collection of arrows (or morphisms) f , g h . . . . Each arrow has specified objects as its domain
and codomain.1 We write f : A→ B for an arrow with domain A and codomain B. For any triple
of objects A,B,C there is an operation of composition: given f : A→ B and g : B → C, we can
form g ◦ f : A→ C. Note that the codomain of f has to match with the domain of g. Moreover,
for each object A, there is an identity arrow idA : A→ A. These data are subject to the following
axioms:
h ◦ (g ◦ f) = (h ◦ g) ◦ f f ◦ idA = f = idB ◦ f
whenever the indicated compositions make sense, i.e. the domains and codomains match appro-
priately.
These definitions appear at first sight fairly innocuous: some kind of algebraic structure, rem-
iniscent of monoids (groups without inverses), but with the clumsy-looking apparatus of objects,
1More formally, there are operations dom, cod from arrows to objects.
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domains and codomains restricting the possibilities for composition of arrows. These first appear-
ances are deceptive, as we shall see, although in a few pages we can only convey a glimpse of the
richness of the notions which arise as the theory unfolds.
Let us now see some first examples of categories.
• The most basic example of a category is Set: the objects are sets, and the arrows are
functions. Composition and identities have their usual meaning for functions.
• Any kind of mathematical structure, together with structure preserving functions, forms a
category. E.g.
– Mon (monoids and monoid homomorphisms)
– Grp (groups and group homomorphisms)
– Vectk (vector spaces over a field k, and linear maps)
– Pos (partially ordered sets and monotone functions)
– Top (topological spaces and continuous functions)
• Rel: objects are sets, arrows R : X → Y are relations R ⊆ X × Y . Relational composition:
R;S(x, z) ⇐⇒ ∃y.R(x, y) ∧ S(y, z)
• Let k be a field (for example, the real or complex numbers). Consider the following category
Matk. The objects are natural numbers. A morphism M : n → m is an n ×m matrix
with entries in k. Composition is matrix multiplication, and the identity on n is the n× n
diagonal matrix.
• Monoids are one-object categories. Arrows correspond to the elements of the monoid, com-
position of arrows to the monoid multiplication, and the identity arrow to the monoid unit.
• A category in which for each pair of objects A, B there is at most one morphism from A
to B is the same thing as a preorder, i.e. a reflexive and transitive relation. Note that the
identity arrows correspond to reflexivity, and composition to transitivity.
2.1.1 Categories as Contexts and as Structures
Note that our first class of examples illustrate the idea of categories as mathematical contexts ;
settings in which various mathematical theories can be developed. Thus for example, Top is the
context for general topology, Grp is the context for group theory, etc.
This issue of “mathematics in context” should be emphasized. The idea that any mathematical
discussion is relative to the category we happen to be working in is pervasive and fundamental.
It allows us simultaneously to be both properly specific and general: specific, in that statements
about mathematical structures are not really precise until we have specified which structures we
are dealing with, and which morphisms we are considering — i.e. which category we are working
in. At the same time, the awareness that we are working in some category allows us to extract
the proper generality for any definition or theorem, by identifying exactly which properties of the
ambient category we are using.
On the other hand, the last two examples illustrate that many important mathematical struc-
tures themselves appear as categories of particular kinds. The fact that two such different kinds of
structures as monoids and posets should appear as extremal versions of categories is also rather
striking.
This ability to capture mathematics both “in the large” and “in the small” is a first indication
of the flexibility and power of categories.
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2.1.2 Arrows vs. Elements
Notice that the axioms for cateories are formulated purely in terms of the algebraic operations
on arrows, without any reference to ‘elements’ of the objects. Indeed, in general elements are
not available in a category. We will refer to any concept which can be defined purely in terms of
composition and identities as arrow-theoretic. We will now take a first step towards learning to
“think with arrows” by seeing how we can replace some familiar definitions for functions between
sets couched in terms of elements by arrow-theoretic equivalents.
We say that a function f : X −→ Y is:
injective if ∀x, x′ ∈ X. f(x) = f(x′) =⇒ x = x′ ,
surjective if ∀y ∈ Y. ∃x ∈ X. f(x) = y ,
monic if ∀g, h : Z → X. f ◦ g = f ◦ h =⇒ g = h ,
epic if ∀g, h : Y → Z. g ◦ f = h ◦ f =⇒ g = h .
Note that injectivity and surjectivity are formulated in terms of elements, while epic and monic
are arrow-theoretic.
Proposition 1 Let f : X → Y . Then:
1. f is injective iff f is monic.
2. f is surjective iff f is epic.
Proof We show 1. Suppose f : X → Y is injective, and that f ◦ g = f ◦ h, where g, h : Z → X .
Then for all z ∈ Z:
f(g(z)) = f ◦ g(z) = f ◦ h(z) = f(h(z)) .
Since f is injective, this implies g(z) = h(z). Hence we have shown that
∀z ∈ Z. g(z) = h(z) ,
and so we can conclude that g = h. So f injective implies f monic.
For the converse, fix a one-element set 1 = {•}. Note that elements x ∈ X are in 1–1 correspon-
dence with functions x¯ : 1→ X , where x¯(•) := x. Moreover, if f(x) = y then y¯ = f ◦ x¯ . Writing
injectivity in these terms, it amounts to the following:
∀x, x′ ∈ X. f ◦ x¯ = f ◦ x¯′ =⇒ x¯ = x¯′.
Thus we see that being injective is a special case of being monic. 
The reader will enjoy — and learn from — proving the equivalence for functions of the condi-
tions of being surjective and epic.
2.1.3 Generality of Notions
Since the concepts of monic and epic are defined in purely arrow-theoretic terms, they make
sense in any category. This possibility for making definitions in vast generality by formulating
them in purely arrow-theoretic terms can be applied to virtually all the fundamental notions and
constructions which pervade mathematics.
As an utterly elementary, indeed “trivial” example, consider the notion of isomorphism. What
is an isomorphism in general? On might try a definition at the level of generality of model theory,
or Bourbaki-style structures, but this is really both unnecessarily elaborate, and still insufficiently
general. Category theory has exactly the language needed to give a perfectly general answer to the
question, in any mathematical context, as specified by a category. An isomorphism in a category
C is an arrow f : A→ B with a two-sided inverse: an arrow g : B → A such that
g ◦ f = idA, f ◦ g = idB.
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One can check that in Set this yields the notion of bijection; in Grp it yields isomorphism of
groups; in Top it yields homeomorphism; in Matk, it yields the usual notion of invertible matrix;
and so on throughout the range of mathematical structures. In a monoid considered as a category,
an isomorphism is an invertible element. Thus a group is exactly a one-object category in which
every arrow is an isomorphism! This cries out for generalization; and the notion of a category in
which every arrow is an isomorphism is indeed significant — it is the idea of a groupoid, which
plays a key roˆle in modern geometry and topology.
We also see here a first indication of the prescriptive nature of categorical concepts. Having
defined a category, what the notion of isomorphism means inside that category is now fixed by
the general definition. We can observe and characterize what that notion is; if it isn’t right for
our purposes, we need to work in a different category.
2.1.4 Replacing Coding by Intrinsic Properties
We now consider one of the most common constructions in mathematics: the formation of “direct
products”. Once again, rather than giving a case-by-case construction of direct products in each
mathematical context we encounter, we can express once and for all a general notion of product,
meaningful in any category — and such that, if a product exists, it is characterised uniquely up to
unique isomorphism. Given a particular mathematical context, i.e. a category, we can then verify
whether on not the product exists in that category. The concrete construction appropriate to the
context will enter only into the proof of existence; all of the useful properties of the product follow
from the general definition. Moreover, the categorical notion of product has a normative force;
we can test whether a concrete construction works as intended by verifying that it satisfies the
general definition.
In set theory, the cartesian product is defined in terms of the ordered pair:
X × Y := {(x, y) | x ∈ X ∧ y ∈ Y }.
It turns out that ordered pairs can be defined in set theory, e.g. as
(x, y) := {{x, y}, y}.
Note that in no sense is such a definition canonical. The essential properties of ordered pairs are:
1. We can retrieve the first and second components x, y of the ordered pair (x, y), allowing
projection functions to be defined:
π1 : (x, y) 7→ x, π2 : (x, y) 7→ y .
2. The information about first and second components completely determines the ordered pair:
(x1, x2) = (y1, y2) ⇐⇒ x1 = y1 ∧ x2 = y2.
The categorical definition expresses these properties in arrow-theoretic terms, meaningful in any
category.
Let A,B be objects in a category C. A product of A and B is an object A× B together with
a pair of arrows A ✛
pi1
A × B
pi2✲ B such that for every such triple A ✛
f
C
g✲ B there
exists a unique morphism
〈f, g〉 : C −→ A×B
such that the following diagram commutes.
A ✛
π1
A×B
π2 ✲ B
C
〈f, g〉
✻
g
✲
✛
f
4
Writing the equations corresponding to this commuting diagram explicitly:
π1 ◦ 〈f, g〉 = f, π2 ◦ 〈f, g〉 = g.
Moreover, 〈f, g〉 is the unique morphism h : C → A×B satisfying these equations.
To relate this definition to our earlier discussion of definitons of pairing for sets, note that a
‘pairing’ A ✛
f
C
g✲ B offers a decomposition of C into components in A and B, at the level
of arrows rather than elements. The fact that pairs are uniquely determined by their components
is expressed in arrow-theoretic terms by the universal property of the product; the fact that for
every candidate pairing, there is a unique arrow into the product, which commutes with taking
components.
As immediate evidence that this definition works in the right way, we note the following
properties of the categorical product (which of course hold in any category):
• The product is determined uniquely up to unique isomorphism. That is, if there are two
pairings satisfying the universal property, there is a unique isomorphism between them which
commutes with taking components. This sweeps away all issues of coding and concrete
representation, and shows that we have isolated the essential content of the notion of product.
We shall prove this property for the related case of terminal objects in the next subsection.
• We can also express the universal property in purely equational terms. This equational
specification of products requires that we have a pairing A ✛
pi1
A × B
pi2✲ B satisfying
the equation
π1 ◦ 〈f, g〉 = f, π2 ◦ 〈f, g〉 = g
as before, and additionally, for any h : C → A×B:
h = 〈π1 ◦ h, π2 ◦ h〉.
This says that any map into the product is uniquely determined by its components. This
equational specification is equivalent to the definition given previously.
We look at how this definition works in some of our example categories.
• In Set, products are the usual cartesian products.
• In Pos, products are cartesian products with the pointwise order.
• In Top, products are cartesian products with the product topology.
• In Vectk, products are direct sums.
• In a poset, seen as a category, products are greatest lower bounds.
2.1.5 Terminal Objects
Our discussion in the previous sub-section was for binary products. The same idea can be extended
to define the product of any family of objects in a category. In particular, the apparently trivial
idea of the product of an empty family of objects turns out to be important. The product of an
empty family of objects in a category C will be an object 1; there are no projections, since there
is nothing in the family to project to! The universal property turns into the following: for each
object A in C, there is a unique arrow from C to 1. Note that compatibility with the projections
trivially holds, since there are no projections! This ‘empty product’ is the notion of terminal
object, which again makes sense in any category.
Examples
• In Set, any one-element set {•} is terminal.
• In Pos, the poset ({•}, {(•, •)}) is terminal.
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• In Top, the space ({•}, {∅, {•}}) is terminal.
• In Vectk, the one-element space {0} is terminal.
• In a poset, seen as a category, a terminal object is a greatest element.
We shall now prove that terminal objects are unique up to (unique) isomorphism. This property
is characteristic of all such “universal” definitions. For example, the apparent arbitrariness in the
fact that any singleton set is a terminal object in Set is answered by the fact that what counts
is the property of being terminal; and this suffices to ensure that any two objects having this
property must be isomorphic to each other.
The proof of the proposition, while elementary, is a first example of distinctively categorical
reasoning.
Proposition 2 If T and T ′ are terminal objects in the category C then there exists a unique
isomorphism T ∼= T ′.
Proof Since T is terminal and T ′ is an object of C, there is a unique arrow τT ′ : T
′ → T . We
claim that τT ′ is an isomorphism.
Since T ′ is terminal and T is an object in C, there is an arrow τ ′T : T → T
′. Thus we obtain
τT ′ ◦ τ
′
T : T → T , while we also have the identity morphism idT : T → T . But T is terminal, and
therefore there exists a unique arrow from T to T , which means that τT ′ ◦ τ
′
T = idT . Similarly,
τ ′T ◦ τT ′ = idT ′ , so τT ′ is indeed an isomorphism. 
One can reduce the corresponding property for binary products to this one, since the definition
of binary product is equivalently expressed by saying that the pairing A ✛
pi1
A × B
pi2✲ B
is terminal in the category of such pairings, where the morphisms are arrows preserving the
components.
It is straightforward to show that if a category has a terminal object, and all binary products,
then it has products of all finite families of objects. Thus these are the two cases usually considered.
2.1.6 Natural Numbers
We might suppose that category theory, while suitable for formulating general notions and struc-
tures, would not work well for specific mathematical objects such as the number systems. In fact,
this is not the case, and the idea of universal definition, which we just caught a first glimpse of in
the categorical notion of product, provides a powerful tool for specifying the basic discrete number
systems of mathematics. We shall illustrate this with the most basic number system of all — the
natural numbers (i.e. the non-negative integers).
Suppose that C is a category with a terminal object 1. We define a natural numbers object in
C to be an object N together with arrows z : 1 → N and s : N → N such that, for every such
triple of an object A and arrows c : 1 → A, f : A → A, there exists a unique arrow (note this
characteristic property of universal definitions again) h : N → A such that the following diagram
commutes:
1
z ✲ N
s ✲ N
A
h
❄
f
✲
c
✲
A
h
❄
Equivalently, this means that the following equations hold:
h ◦ z = c, h ◦ s = f ◦ h.
Once again, the universal property implies that if a natural numbers object exists in C, it
is unique up to unique isomorphism. We are not committed to any particular representation
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of natural numbers; we have specified the properties a structure with a constant and a unary
operation must have in order to function as the natural numbers in a particular mathematical
context.
In Set, we can verify that N = {0, 1, 2, . . .} equipped with
z : {•} → N :: • 7→ 0, s : N→ N :: n 7→ n+ 1
does indeed form a natural numbers object. But we are not committed to any particular set-
theoretic representation of N: whether as von Neumann ordinals, Zermelo numerals [10] or any-
thing else. Indeed, any countable set X with a particular element x picked out by a map z, and a
unary operation s : X → X which is injective and has X \{x} as its image, will fulfil the definition;
and any two such systems will be canonically isomorphic.
Note that, if we are given a natural numbers object (N, z, s) in an abstract category C, the
resources of definition by primitive recursion are available to us. Indeed, we can define numerals
relative to N : n¯ : 1→ N := sn ◦ z. Here sn is defined inductively: s1 = s, sn+1 = s ◦ sn.2 Given
any (A, c, f), with the unique arrow h : N → A given by the universal property, we can check that
h ◦ n¯ = fn ◦ c. In fact, if we assume that C has finite products, and refine the definition of natural
numbers object to allow for parameters, or if we keep the definition of natural numbers object as
it is but assume that C is cartesian closed [20], then all primitive recursive function definitions can
be interpreted in C, and will have their usual equational properties.
2.1.7 Functors: category theory takes its own medicine
Part of the “categorical philosophy” is:
Don’t just look at the objects; take the morphisms into account too.
We can also apply this to categories! A “morphism of categories” is a functor. A functor F : C → D
is given by:
• An object map, assigning an object FA of D to every object A of C.
• An arrow map, assigning an arrow Ff : FA→ FB of D to every arrow f : A→ B of C, in
such a way that composition and identities are preserved:
F (g ◦ f) = Fg ◦ Ff , F idA = idFA].
Note that we use the same symbol to denote the object and arrow maps; in practice, this never
causes confusion. The conditions expressing preservation of composition and identities are called
functoriality.
As a first glimpse as to the importance of functoriality, note the following:
Proposition 3 Functors preserve isomorphisms; if f : A→ B is an isomorphism, so is Ff .
Proof Suppose that f is an isomorphism, with inverse f−1. Then
F (f−1) ◦ F (f) = F (f−1 ◦ f) = F (idA) = idFA
and similarly F (f) ◦ F (f−1) = idFB. So F (f
−1) is a two-sided inverse for Ff , which is thus an
isomorphism. 
2There is a metainduction going on here, using a natural number object outside the category under discussion.
This is not essential, but is a useful device for seeing what is going on.
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Examples
• Let (P,≤), (Q,≤) be preorders (seen as categories). A functor F : (P,≤) −→ (Q,≤) is
specified by an object-map, say F : P → Q, and an appropriate arrow-map. The arrow-map
corresponds to the condition
∀p1, p2 ∈ P. p1 ≤ p2 ⇒ F (p1) ≤ F (p2) ,
i.e. to monotonicity of F . Moreover, the functoriality conditions are trivial since in the
codomain (Q,≤) all hom-sets are singletons.
Hence, a functor between preorders is just a monotone map.
• Let (M, ·, 1), (N, ·, 1) be monoids. A functor F : (M, ·, 1) −→ (N, ·, 1) is specified by a trivial
object map (monoids are categories with a single object) and an arrow-map, say F :M → N .
The functoriality conditions correspond to
∀m1,m2 ∈M.F (m1 ·m2) = F (m1) · F (m2) , F (1) = 1 ,
i.e. to F being a monoid homomorphism.
Hence, a functor between monoids is just a monoid homomorphism.
Some further examples:
• The covariant powerset functor P : Set→ Set:
X 7→ P(X) , (f : X → Y ) 7→ P(f) := S 7→ {f(x) | x ∈ S}.
• More sophisticated examples: e.g. homology. The basic idea of algebraic topology is that
there are functorial assignments of algebraic objects (e.g. groups) to topological spaces.
The fact that functoriality implies that isomorphisms are preserved shows that these assign-
ments are topological invariants. Variants of this idea (‘(co)homology theories’) are pervasive
throughout modern pure mathematics.
2.1.8 The category of categories
There is a category Cat whose objects are categories, and whose arrows are functors. Identities
in Cat are given by identity functors:
IdC : C −→ C := A 7→ A, f 7→ f.
Composition of functors is defined in the evident fashion. Note that if F : C → D and G : D → E
then, for f : A→ B in C,
G ◦ F (f) := G(F (f)) : G(F (A)) −→ G(F (B))
so the types work out. A category of categories sounds (and is) circular, but in practice is harmless:
one usually makes some size restriction on the categories, and then Cat will be too ‘big’ to be an
object of itself.
2.1.9 Universality and Adjoints
Universality arises when we are interested in finding canonical solutions to problems of construc-
tion: that is, we are interested not just in the existence of a solution but in its canonicity. This
canonicity should guarantee uniqueness, in the sense we have become familiar with: a canonical
solution should be unique up to (unique) isomorphism.
The notion of canonicity has a simple interpretation in the case of posets, as an extremal
solution: one that is the least or the greatest among all solutions. Such an extremal solution is
obviously unique. For example, consider the problem of finding a lower bound of a pair of elements
A, B in a poset P : a greatest lower bound of A and B is an extremal solution to this problem. As
we have seen, this is the specialisation to posets of the problem of constructing a product:
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• A product of A, B in a poset is an element C such that C ≤ A and C ≤ B, (C is a lower
bound);
• and for any other solution C′, i.e. C′ such that C′ ≤ A and C′ ≤ B, we have C′ ≤ C. (C is
a greatest lower bound.)
The ideas of universality and adjunctions have an appealingly simple form in the case of posets,
which is, moreover, useful in its own right, and in particular has some striking applications to
logic. We shall develop the ideas in that special case.
Suppose g : Q→ P is a monotone map between posets. Given x ∈ P , a g-approximation of x
(from above) is an element y ∈ Q such that x ≤ g(y).
A best g-approximation of x is an element y ∈ Q such that
x ≤ g(y) ∧ ∀z ∈ Q. (x ≤ g(z) ⇒ y ≤ z ) .
If a best g-approximation exists then it is clearly unique.
Discussion It is worth clarifying the notion of best g-approximation. If y is a best g-approximation
to x, then in particular, by monotonicity of g, g(y) is the least element of the set of all g(z) where
z ∈ Q and x ≤ g(z). However, the property of being a best approximation is much stronger than
the mere existence of a least element of this set. We are asking for y itself to be the least, in Q,
among all elements z such that x ≤ g(z). Thus, even if g is surjective, so that for every x there is
a y ∈ Q such that g(y) = x, there need not exist a best g-approximation to x. This is exactly the
issue of having a canonical choice of solution.
Exercise Give an example of a surjective monotone map g : Q → P , and an element x ∈ P ,
such that there is no best g-approximation to x in Q.
If such a best g-approximation f(x) exists for all x ∈ P then we have a function f : P → Q such
that, for all x ∈ P , z ∈ Q:
x ≤ g(z) ⇐⇒ f(x) ≤ z . (1)
We say that f is the left adjoint of g, and g is the right adjoint of f . It is immediate from the
definitions that the left adjoint of g, if it exists, is uniquely determined by g.
Proposition 4 If such a function f exists, then it is monotone. Moreover,
idP ≤ g ◦ f, f ◦ g ≤ idQ, f ◦ g ◦ f = f, g ◦ f ◦ g = g.
Proof If we take z = f(x) in equation (1), then since f(x) ≤ f(x), x ≤ g ◦ f(x). Similarly,
taking x = g(z) we obtain f ◦ g(z) ≤ z. Now, the ordering on functions h, k : P −→ Q is the
pointwise order :
h ≤ k ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈ P. h(x) ≤ k(x).
This gives the first two equations.
Now, if x ≤P x
′ then x ≤ x′ ≤ g ◦ f(x′), so f(x′) is a g-approximation of x, and hence
f(x) ≤ f(x′). Thus, f is monotone.
Finally, using the fact that composition is monotone with respect to the pointwise order on
functions, and the first two equations:
g = idP ◦ g ≤ g ◦ f ◦ g ≤ g ◦ idQ = g,
and hence g = g ◦ f ◦ g. The other equation is proved similarly. 
9
Examples
• Consider the inclusion map
i : Z →֒ R .
This has both a left adjoint fL and a right adjoint fR, where fL, fR : R→ Z. For all z ∈ Z,
r ∈ R:
z ≤ fR(r) ⇐⇒ i(z) ≤ r , fL(r) ≤ z ⇐⇒ r ≤ i(z) .
We see from these defining properties that the right adjoint maps a real r to the greatest
integer below it (the extremal solution to finding an integer below a given real). This is the
standard floor function.
Similarly, the left adjoint maps a real to the least integer above it, yielding the ceiling
function. Thus:
fR(r) = ⌊r⌋ , fL(r) = ⌈r⌉ .
• Consider a relation R ⊆ X × Y . R induces a function:
fR : P(X) −→ P(Y ) := S 7→ {y ∈ Y | ∃x ∈ S. xRy} .
This has a right adjoint [R] : P(Y ) −→ P(X):
S ⊆ [R]T ⇐⇒ fR(S) ⊆ T .
The definition of [R] which satisfies this condition is:
[R]T := {x ∈ X | ∀y ∈ Y. xRy ⇒ y ∈ T } .
If we consider a set of worlds W with an accessibility relation R ⊆ W ×W as in Kripke
semantics for modal logic, we see that [R] gives the usual Kripke semantics for the modal
operator ✷, seen as a propositional operator mapping the set of worlds satisfied by a formula
φ to the set of worlds satisfied by ✷φ.
On the other hand, if we think of the relation R as the denotation of a (possibly non-
deterministic) program, and T as a predicate on states, then [R]T is exactly the weakest
precondition wp(R, T ) [14]. In Dynamic Logic [28], the two settings are combined, and
we can write expressions such as [R]T directly, where T will be (the denotation of) some
formula, and R the relation corresponding to a program.
2.1.10 Logical notions as adjunctions
We shall look at some examples of adjunctions arising from logic [23], which also give a first
impression of the deep connections which exist between category theory and logic.
We begin with implication. Implication and conjunction — whether classical or intuitionistic
— are related by the following bidirectional inference rule:
φ ∧ ψ ⊢ θ
φ ⊢ ψ → θ .
If we form the preorder of formulas related by entailment as a category, this rule becomes a
relationship between arrows which holds in this category. In fact, it can be shown that this
uniquely characterizes implication, and is a form of universal definition. Note that it gives the
essence of what implication is. The way one proves an implication—essentially the only way—is
to add the antecedent to one’s assumptions and then prove the consequent. This is justified by
the above rule.
In terms of the boolean algebra of sets, define X ⇒ Y = Xc ∪ Y , where Xc is the set
complement. Then we have, for any sets X , Y , Z:
X ∩ Y ⊆ Z ⇐⇒ X ⊆ Y ⇒ Z.
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This says precisely that the function fX : Z 7→ Z ∩ X is left adjoint to the function gX : Y 7→
X ⇒ Y .
The same algebraic relation holds in any Heyting algebra, and defines intuitionistic implication.
Now we show that this same formal structure of adjoints underpins quantification. This is the
fundamental insight due to Lawvere [23], that quantifiers are adjoints to substitution.
Consider a function f : X → Y . This induces a function
f−1 : P(Y ) −→ P(X) :: T 7→ {x ∈ X | f(x) ∈ T }.
This function f−1 has both a left adjoint ∃(f) : P(X) −→ P(Y ), and a right adjoint ∀(f) :
P(X) −→ P(Y ). These adjoints are uniquely specified by the following conditions. For all S ⊆ X ,
T ⊆ Y :
∃(f)(S) ⊆ T ⇐⇒ S ⊆ f−1(T ), f−1(T ) ⊆ S ⇐⇒ T ⊆ ∀(f)(S).
The unique functions satisfying these conditions can be defined explicitly as follows:
∃(f)(S) := {y ∈ Y | ∃x ∈ X. f(x) = y ∧ x ∈ S} ,
∀(f)(S) := {y ∈ Y | ∀x ∈ X. f(x) = y ⇒ x ∈ S} .
Given a formula φ with free variables in {v1, . . . , vn+1}, it will receive its Tarskian denotation JφK
in P(An+1) as the set of satisfying assignments:
JφK = {s ∈ An+1 | s |=X φ} .
We have a projection function
π : An+1 −→ An :: (a1, . . . , an+1) 7→ (a1, . . . , an) .
Note that this projection is the Tarskian denotation of the tuple of terms (v1, . . . , vn). We can
characterize the standard quantifiers as adjoints to this projection:
J∀vn+1. φK = ∀(π)(JφK), J∃vn+1. φK = ∃(π)(JφK) .
More explicitly, the Tarski semantics over a structure M = (A, . . .) assigns such formulas values
in P(An+1). We can regard the quantifiers ∃vn+1, ∀vn+1 as functions
∃(π), ∀(π) : P(An+1) −→ P(An)
∃(π)(S) = {s ∈ An | ∃a ∈ A. s[vn+1 7→ a] ∈ S}
∀(π)(S) = {s ∈ An | ∀a ∈ A. s[vn+1 7→ a] ∈ S}
If we unpack the adjunction conditions for the universal quantifier, they yield the following bidi-
rectional inference rule:
Γ ⊢X φ
Γ ⊢X ∀vn+1. φ
X = {v1, . . . , vn} .
Here the set X keeps track of the free variables in the assumptions Γ. Note that the usual
“eigenvariable condition” is automatically taken care of in this way.
Since adjoints are uniquely determined, this characterization completely captures the meaning
of the quantifiers.
2.2 Discussion: the significance of category theory
We turn from this all too brief glimpse at the basics of category theory to discuss its conceptual
significance, and why it might matter to philosophy.
The basic feature of category theory which makes it conceptually fascinating and worthy of
philosophical study is that it is not just another mathematical theory, but a way of mathematical
thinking, and of doing mathematics, which is genuinely distinctive, and in particular very different
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to the prevailing set-theoretic style which preceded it. If one wanted a clear-cut example of a
paradigm-shift in the Kuhnian sense within mathematics, involving a new way of looking at the
mathematical universe, then the shift from the set-theoretic to the categorical perspective provides
the most dramatic example we possess.
This has been widely misunderstood. Category theory has been portrayed, sometimes by
its proponents, but more often by its detractors, as offering an alternative foundational scheme
for mathematics to set theory. But this is to miss the point. What category theory offers is
an alternative to foundational schemes in the traditional sense themselves. This point has been
argued with great clarity and cogency in a forceful and compelling essay by Steve Awodey [7]. We
shall not attempt to replicate his arguments, but will just make some basic observations.
Firstly, it must be emphasized that the formalization of mathematics within the language of
set theory, as developed in the first half of the twentieth century, has been extremely successful,
and has enabled the formulation of mathematical definitions and arguments with a previously
unparalleled degree of precision and rigour. However, the set-theoretical paradigm has some
deficiencies.
The set-theoretical formalization of mathematics rests on the idea of representing mathematical
objects as sets which can be defined within a formal set theory, typically ZFC. It is indeed a
significant empirical observation, as remarked by Blass [11], that mathematical objects can be
thus represented, and mathematical proofs carried out using the axioms of set theory. This leads
to claims such as the recent one by Kunen [19] (p. 14), that
All abstract mathematical concepts are set-theoretic. All concrete mathematical
objects are specific sets.
This claim fails to ring true, for several reasons.
• Firstly, the set-theoretic representation is too concrete. it involves irrelevant details and
choices — it is a coding rather than a structural representation of the concepts at hand. We
saw this illustrated with the issue of defining ordered pairs in set theory, and the contrast
with the categorical definition of product, which extracted the essential structural features
of pairing at the right level of abstraction. Even if we think of number systems, the repre-
sentation say of the natural numbers as the finite ordinals in set theory is just a particular
coding — there are many others. The essential features of the natural numbers are, rather,
conveyed by the universal definition of natural numbers object — which makes sense in any
category. We should not ask what natural numbers are, but rather what they do — or what
we can do with them. Set theoretic representations of mathematical objects give us too
much information — and information of the wrong kind.
• Furthermore, by being too specific, set theoretic representations lose much of the generality
that mathematical concepts, as used by mathematicians, naturally have. Indeed, the notion
of natural numbers object makes sense in any category with a terminal object. Moreover, as
a universal consruction, if it exists in a given category, it is unique up to unique isomorphism.
Once we are in a particular mathematical context specified by a category, we can look and see
what the natural numbers object is — while knowing that the standard reasoning principles
such as proof by induction and definition by primitive recursion will hold.
• When one passes to more inherently structural notions, such as ‘cohomology theory’ or
‘coalgebra’ the assertion that ‘all abstract mathematical concepts are set-theoretic’ becomes
staggeringly implausible, unless we replace ‘are’ by ‘are codable into’. The crudity of the pure
set-theoretic language becomes all too apparent. One might indeed say that insensitivity to
the distortions of coding is a tell-tale feature of the set-theoretic cast of thought.
It may be useful to draw an analogy here with geometry. A major theme of 20th cen-
tury geometry was the replacement of coordinate-based definitions of geometrical notions
(such as tensors or varieties) with ‘intrinsic’ definitions. Coordinates are still very useful
for calculations, but the intrinsic definitions are more fundamental and more illuminating
12
— and ultimately more powerful. The move from set-theoretical encodings, which identify
mathematical structures with specific entities in the set-theoretical universe, to universal
characterizations which make sense in any mathematical context (category) satisfying some
given background conditions, similarly leads to greater insight and technical power.
The foundationalist critique of category theory proceeds as follows:
1. Category theory cannot emancipate itself completely from set theory, and indeed relies on
set theory at certain points.
2. Hence it is not truly fundamental, and cannot serve as a foundation for mathematics.
On the first point, one can discern two main arguments.
• Firstly the very definition of category and functor presuppose the notion of a collection of
things, and of operations on these things. So one needs an underlying theory of collections
and operations as a substrate for category theory.
This is true enough; but the required ‘theory of collections and operations’ is quite rudi-
mentary. Certainly nothing like formal set theory is presupposed. In fact, the basic notions
of categories are essentially algebraic in form [15]; that is, they can be formalized as partial
algebras, in which the domains of definition of the operations can themselves be defined
equationally, in terms of operations which have already been specified. For example, if we
consider composition as a partial binary operation comp on arrows, then comp(g, f) is defined
just when cod(f) = dom(g).
• The second argument is that at various points, issues of size enter into category theory. We
saw an example of this in considering the category Cat of categories and functors. Is Cat
an object of Cat? To avoid such issues, one usually defines a version of Cat with some size
restriction; for example, one only considers categories whose underlying collection of arrows
form a set in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Then Cat will be too large (a proper class) to be
an object of itself.
There are various technical elaborations of this point. One can consider categories of ar-
bitrary size in a stratified fashion, by assuming a sufficient supply of inaccessible cardinals
(and hence of ‘Grothendieck universes’ [11]). One can also formalize notions of size relative
to an ambient category one is ‘working inside’; which actually describes what one is doing
when formalizing category-thoretic notions in set theory.
Again, the point that in practice category theory is not completely emancipated from set
theory is fair enough. What should be borne in mind, though, is how innocuous this residue
of set theory in category theory actually is in practice. The strongly typed nature of category
theory means that one rarely — one is tempted to say ‘never’ — stumbles over these size
issues; they serve more as a form of type-checking than as a substantial topic in their own
right. Moreover, category theoretic arguments typically work generically in relation to size;
thus in practice, one argument fits all cases, despite the stratification.
All this is to say that, while category theory is not completely disentangled from set theory,
it is quite misleading to see this as the main issue in considering the philosophical significance
of categories. The temptation to do so comes from the foundationalist attitude expressed in (2)
above.
The form of categorical structuralism sketched by Awodey in [7] stands in contrast to this
set-theoretic foundationalism. It is a much better representation of mathematical practice, and it
directs attention towards the kind of issues we have been discussing, and away from the well-worn
tracks of traditional thought in the philosophy of mathematics, which after more than a century
have surely reached, and passed, the point of diminishing returns.
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2.2.1 Categories and Logic
Our brief introduction to category theory did not reach the rich and deep connections which exist
between category theory and logic. Categorical logic is a well-developed area, with several different
branches. The most prominent of these is topos theory.
Topos theory is an enormous field in its own right, now magisterially presented in Peter John-
stone’s magnum opus [17]. Because, among other things, it provides a categorical formulation of
a form of set theory, it is often seen as the main or even the only part of category theory relevant
to philosophy. Topos theory is seen as an alternative or rival to standard versions of set theory,
and the relevance of category theory to the foundations of mathematics is judged in these terms.
There are many things within topos theory of great conceptual interest; but topos theory is
far from covering all of categorical logic, let alone all of category theory. From our perspective,
there is a great deal of ‘logic’ in the elementary parts of category theory which we have diacussed.
The overemphasis on topos theory in this context arises from the wish to understand the novel
perspectives of category theory in terms of the traditional concepts of logic and set theory. This
impulse is understandable, but misguided. As we have already argued, learning to look at mathe-
matics from a category-theoretic viewpoint is a real and deep-seated paradigm shift. It is only by
embracing it that we will reap the full benefits.
Thus while we heartily recommend learning about topos theory, this should build on having
already absorbed the lessons to be learnt from category theory in general, and with the aware-
ness that there are other important connections between category theory and logic, in particular
categorical proof theory and type theory.
2.2.2 Applications of Category Theory
As we have argued, category theory has a great deal of intrinsic conceptual interest. Beyond this,
it offers great potential for applications in formal philosophy, as a powerful and versatile tool for
building theories. The best evidence for this comes from Theoretical Computer Science, which
has seen an extensive development of applications of category theory over the past four decades.
Some of the main areas where category theory has been applied in Computer Science include:
• Semantics of Computation. Denotational semantics of programming languages makes
extensive use of categories. In particular, categories of domains have been widely studied
[30, 5]. An important topic has been the study of recursive domain equations such as
D ∼= [D → D]
which is a space isomorphic to its own function space. Such spaces do not arise in ordinary
mathematics, but are just what is needed to provide models for the type-free λ-calculus [9],
in which one has self-application, leading to expressions such as the Y combinator
λf.(λx.f(xx))(λx.f(xx))
which produces fixpoints from arbitrary terms: YM =M(YM).
The solution of such domain equations is expressed in terms of fixpoints of functors:
FX ∼= X.
This approach to the consistent interpretation of a large class of recursive data types has
proved very powerful and expressive, in allowing a wide range of reflexive and recursive
behaviours to be modelled.
Another form of categorical structure which has proved very useful in articulating the seman-
tic structure of programs are monads. Various ‘notions of computation’ can be encapsulated
as monads [26]. This has proved a fruitful idea, not only in semantics, but also in the
development of functional programming languages.
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• Type Theories. An important point of contact between category theory and logic is in
the realm of proof theory and type theory. Logical systems can be represented as categories
in which formulas are objects, proofs are arrows, and equality of arrows reflects equality
of proofs [20]. There are deep connections between cut-elimination in proof systems, and
coherence theorems in category theory. Moreover, this paradigm extends to type theories of
various kinds, which have played an important roˆle in computer science as core calculi for
programming languages, and as the basis for automated proof systems.
• Coalgebra. Over the past couple of decades, a very lively research area has developed
in the field of coalgebra. In particular, ‘universal coalgebra’ has been quite extensively
developed as a very attractive theory of systems [29]. This entire area is a good witness to
the possibilities afforded by categorical thinking. The idea of an algebra as a set equipped
with some operations is familiar, and readily generalizes to the usual setting for universal
algebra. Category theory allows us to dualize the usual discussion of algebras to obtain a
very general notion of coalgebras of an endofunctor. Coalgebras open up a new and quite
unexpected territory, and provides an effective abstraction and mathematical theory for a
central class of computational phenomena:
– Programming over infinite data structures, such as streams, lazy lists, infinite trees, etc.
– A novel notion of coinduction
– Modelling state-based computations of all kinds
– A general notion of observation equivalence between processes.
– A general form of coalgebraic logic, which can be seen as a wide-ranging generalization
of modal logic.
In fact, coalgebra provides the basis for a very expressive and flexible theory of discrete,
state-based dynamical systems, which seem ripe for much wider application than has been
considered thus far; for a recent application to the representation of physical systems, see
[2].
• Monoidal Categories.
Monoidal categories impart a geometrical flavour to category theory. They have a beautiful
description in terms of ‘string diagrams’ [31], which allows equational proofs to be carried out
in a visually compelling way. There are precise correspondences between free monoidal cate-
gories of various kinds, and constructions of braids, tangles, links, and other basic structures
in knot theory and low-dimensional topology. Monoidal categories are also the appropriate
general setting for the discussion of multilinear algebra, and, as has recently been shown, for
much of the basic apparatus of quantum mechanics and quantum information: tensor prod-
ucts, traces, kets, bras and scalars, map-state duality, Bell states, teleportation and more
[3, 4]. There are also deep links to linear logic and other substructural, ‘resource-sensitive’
logics, and to diagrammatic representations of proofs. For a paper showing links between all
these topics, see [1]. Monoidal categories are used in the modelling of concurrent processes
[25], and are beginning to be employed in ‘computational systems biology’ [18].
Altogether, the development of structures based on monoidal categories, and their use in
modelling a wide range of computational, physical, and even biological phenomena, is one
of the liveliest areas in current logically and semantically oriented Theoretical Computer
Science.
It is interesting to compare and contrast the two rich realms of monoidal categories and the
structures built upon them, on the one hand; and topos theory, on the other. One might
say: the linear world, and the cartesian world. It is still not clear how these two worlds
should be related. A clearer understanding of the mathematical and structural issues here
may shed light on difficult questions such as the relation of quantum and classical in physics.
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Having surveyed some of the ways in which category theory has been used within Computer
Science, we shall now consider some of the features and qualities of category theory which have
made it particularly suitable for these applications, and which may suggest a wider range of
possible applications within the scope of formal philosophy.
Modelling at the right level of abstraction As we have discussed, category theory goes
beyond coding to extract the essential features of concepts in terms of universal characterizations,
which are then uniquely specified up to isomorphism. This is not just aesthetically pleasing; as
experience in Computer Science has shown, working at the right level of abstraction is essential if
large and complex systems are to be described and reasoned about in a managable fashion. Formal
philosophy will benefit enormously by learning this lesson — among others! — from Computer
Science.
Compositionality Another deep lesson to be learned from Computer Science is the importance
of compositionality, in the general sense of a form of description of complex systems in terms of
their parts. This notion originates in logic, but has been greatly widened in scope and applicability
in its use in computer science.
The traditional approach to systems modelling in the sciences has been monolithic; one con-
siders a whole system, models it with a system of differential equations or some other formalism,
and then analyzes the model.
In the compositional approach, one starts with a fixed set of basic, simple building blocks, and
constructions for building new, more complex systems out of given sub-systems, and builds up the
required complex system with these. This typically leads to some form of algebraic description of
complex systems:
S = ω(S1, . . . , Sn)
where ω is an operation corresponding to one of the system-building constructions.
In order to understand the logical properties of such a system, one can develop a matching
compositional view:
S1 |= φ1, . . . , Sn |= φn
ω(S1, . . . , Sn) |= φ
One searches for a rule will allows one to reduce the verification of a property of a complex system
to verifications of sub-properties for its components.
The compositional methods for description and analysis of systems which have been developed
in Computer Science are ripe for application in a much wider range of scientific contexts — and
in formal philosophy.
Mappings between representations Another familiar theme in Computer Science is the need
for multiple levels of abstraction in describing and analyzing complex systems, and for mappings
between them. Functorial methods provide the most general and powerful basis for such mappings.
Particular cases, such as Galois connections, which specialize the categorical notion of adjoint
functors to posets, are widely used in abstract interpretation [13].
Normative criteria for definitions As we have already remarked on a couple of occasions,
category theory has a strong normative force. If we devise a mapping from one kind of structure
to another, category theory tells us that we should demand that it maps morphisms as well as
objects, and that it should be functorial. Similarly, if we devise some kind of product for a certain
type of structures, category theory tells us which properties our construction should satisfy to
indeed be a product in the corresponding category. More generally, constructions, if they are
‘canonical’, should satisfy a suitable universal property; and if they do, then they are unique up
to isomorphism. There are other important criteria too, such as naturality (which we have not
discussed).
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These demands and criteria to be satisfied should be seen as providing valuable guidance, as we
seek to develop a suitable theory to capture some phenomenon. If we have no such guidance, it is
all too likely that we may make various ad hoc definitions, not really knowing what we are doing.
As it is, once we have specified a category, there are an enormous range of well-posed questions
about its structure which we can ask. Does the category have products? Other kinds of limits and
colimits? Is it cartesian closed? Is it a topos? And so on. By the time we have answered these
questions, we will already know a great deal about the structure of the category, and what we can
do with it. We can also then focus on the more distinctive features of the category, which may in
turn lead to a characterization of it, or perhaps to a classification of categories of that kind.
2.3 Logic And Category Theory As Tools For Building Theories
The project of scientific or formal philosophy, which seems to be gathering new energy in recent
times, can surely benefit from the methods and tools offered by Category theory. Indeed, it can
surely not afford to neglect them. Logic has been used as the work-horse of formal philosophy
for many years, but the limitations of logic as traditionally conceived become apparent as soon as
one takes a wider view of the intellectual landscape. In particular, Computer Science has led the
way in finding new ways of applying logic — and new forms of logic and structural mathematics
which can be fruitfully applied.
Philosophers and foundational thinkers who are willing and able to grasp these opportunities
will find a rich realm of possibilities opening up before them. Perhaps this brief essay, modest in
scope as it is, will point someone along this road. If so, the author will feel handsomely rewarded.
3 Guide to Further Reading
The lecture notes [6] are a natural follow-up to this article.
The short book [27] is nicely written and gently paced. A very clear, thorough, and essentially
self-contained introduction to basic category theory is given in [8].
Another very nicely written text, focussing on the connections between categories and logic,
and especially topos theory, is [16], recently reissued by Dover Books. The book [24] is pitched at
an elementary level, but offers insights by one of the key contributors to category theory.
The text [21] is a classic by one of the founders of category theory. It assumes considerable
background knowledge of mathematics to fully appreciate its wide-ranging examples, but it pro-
vides invaluable coverage of the key topics. The 3-volume handbook [12] provides coverage of a
broad range of topics in category theory.
A classic text on categorical logic and type theory is [20]. A more advanced text on topos
theory is [22]; while [17] is a comprehensive treatise, of which Volume 3 is still to appear.
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